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Introduction 
The revival of European integration since the mid-1980s is clearly characterised by neo-
liberal restructuring and has, thus, gone hand in hand with globalisation and the 
increasing importance of transnational production dominated by transnational 
corporations (TNCs), the emergence of an integrated financial market at the global level 
and the dominance of neo-liberal economics. Neo-liberal restructuring in the EU is 
expressed in the deregulation and liberalisation of national economies within the Internal 
Market programme as well as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which instructs the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to make price stability its sole primary objective and 
constrains member states’ fiscal policy through the neo-liberal convergence criteria of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The flanking social measures of the Social Dimension 
do not change this fundamental neo-liberal direction (Bieler 2006: 9-14). In its 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the EU exported an even more market-
radical variant of neo-liberalism to the new member states, who were not granted 
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immediate labour mobility and full access to the EU’s redistributive policies (Bohle 
2006).  
 At the global level, neo-liberal restructuring has led to a drastic increase in 
inequality. On the one hand, ‘GDP growth in 2006 stood at 5.2 per cent, and the world 
economy grew at an average of 4.1 per cent between 1996 and 2006’ (Bieler et al 2008: 
9). On the other, unemployment increased to an all-time high of 195.2 million people in 
2006. The Gini coefficient, which is used to measure inter-country inequality and where 
0 signifies perfect equality and 100 signifies complete inequality, rose from 43 in 1980 to 
54 in 1999 to 67 in 2005. This rising inequality between countries has been accompanied 
with rising inequality within most of the countries. ‘Out of 73 countries measured 
between the 1960s and 2000, 54 showed rising inequality, 12 were constant and only 
seven had declining inequality’ (Bieler et al 2008: 10). In short, neo-liberal globalisation 
has led to an increase in wealth, but at the price of increasing inequality between and 
within countries. Within the enlarged EU, a recent study has concluded that integration 
has actually led to diminishing regional inequalities. At the same time, however, 
inequalities within countries have increased steadily. ‘The regional inequalities within 
states in the enlarged Europe have increased by 15 per cent over the last eight years, 
while the between-nation inequalities in Europe have fallen by 45 per cent’ (Heidenreich 
and Wunder 2008: 25). The new Central and Eastern European member states are in 
particular affected by increasing internal inequalities. As Heidenreich and Wunder 
remark, ‘since the middle of the 1990s, in the central European countries in particular, a 
sharp increase in regional inequalities has been observed (perhaps a counter movement to 
the “repressed inequalities” of the socialist period)’ (Heidenreich and Wunder 2008: 27). 
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Looking at the EU and its current 27 member states as a whole, unemployment has come 
down slightly from an average 8.6 per cent in 2000 to 7.1 per cent in 2007, but 
historically compared to the immediate post-war situation in Western Europe this is still a 
relatively high figure (Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_33076576&_
dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL; accessed 9 May 2008). In short, neo-liberal 
restructuring has led to higher levels of inequality within the EU member states without 
reducing overall unemployment drastically.  
Trade unions have had an ambivalent position on European integration since the 
mid-1980s. They supported further integration, but in a ‘yes, but’ position demanded that 
economic integration was accompanied by social and political integration, including a re-
regulation of capital at the European level. Ultimately, however, this strategy has had 
only limited results considering the rather weak development of the EU Social 
Dimension. Hence, it is often alleged that the ‘yes, but’ strategy by trade unions has 
resulted in some kind of symbolic Euro-corporatism, where unions can participate in 
discussions without having the chance of making a more significant impact on individual 
proposals (e.g. Ryner and Schulten 2003). As Taylor and Mathers (2002: 54) have put it, 
‘“the social partnership” approach that dominates the thinking of leading members of the 
European labour movement amounts to a strategy that not only further abandons the 
autonomy of the labour movement but confirms the logic of neo-liberalism through 
“supply side corporatism” or “progressive competitiveness”.’ Thus, trade unions are 
accused of having been co-opted into neo-liberal restructuring and are, therefore, of no 
importance to anti – neo-liberal movements. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the 
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position of European trade unions on neo-liberal restructuring in the EU. It will be argued 
that while certain trade unions have started to accept some neo-liberal concepts, trade 
unions continue to criticise restructuring and the related levels of rising inequality.  
 It is frequently argued that to speak of neo-liberalism would be incorrect since it 
means many different things to different people and it would have so many different 
strands and varieties that any general labelling would imply a gross simplification. 
Nevertheless, within resistance circles people know exactly what is meant with neo-
liberal economics and individuals can regularly identify, how neo-liberal restructuring is 
affecting their specific working-place and life (Bieler and Morton 2004). Rejecting neo-
liberalism as an appropriate set of ideas to engage with can, therefore, be unmasked as a 
political move to undermine fundamental resistance to neo-liberal economics. 
Highlighting the different possibilities within neo-liberalism makes us overlook the 
fundamental problems with all currents of this set of economic ideas. The first section of 
this paper will, therefore, engage with the rise of neo-liberal economics and look in more 
detail at the way it has become embedded within the political economy of the EU. Then, 
a brief overview of several national labour movements is provided to assess whether they 
have accepted neo-liberal economics, before pointing to two potentially useful strategies 
for trade unions at the European level to counter neo-liberal restructuring more 
successfully. The conclusion will provide some thoughts on the chances of resistance.  
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The rise of neo-liberalism and its embedding within European integration 
 
Neo-liberalism has been around for many years since the early 20th century and especially 
the work of Friedrich August von Hayek. In the post-war years of reconstruction in 
Europe, it did, however, receive little attention. Keynesian demand-side management 
seemed to provide successfully a situation of full employment combined with economic 
growth and rising profits. Only during the world-wide economic recessions during the 
1970s, when developed countries around the world were characterised by stagflation, i.e. 
economic stagnation combined with high levels of inflation, did neo-liberal economics 
receive new attention. The rise of neo-liberalism can be divided into four distinctive 
moments. During the 1970s, it first regained prominence as a political economy critique 
of Keynesianism and was implemented as an experiment in Pinochet’s Chile in 1973. 
Then, it was developed into a programme of capitalist restructuring and implemented in 
the USA from 1976 and the UK from 1979 onwards (Harvey 2006: 12, 15-17), before it 
became associated with a positive interpretation of globalisation in the 1990s, developing 
into a hegemonic creed (Gamble 2001, Overbeek 1999). The shift from the second to the 
third stage should not be understood as a smooth process, however. In both, the US and 
UK neo-liberal restructuring had run into problems with less than impressive economic 
results. As Peck and Tickell argue, in this shift from what can be called ‘roll-back neo-
liberalism’ to ‘roll-out neo-liberalism’ ‘the agenda has gradually moved from one 
preoccupied with the active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and 
social-collectivist institutions (broadly defined) to one focused on the purposeful 
construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and 
regulatory relations’ (Peck and Tickell 2002: 384). Importantly, in this process neo-
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liberalism has been further entrenched at different geographical scales including the 
regional and international context. The depoliticisation of monetary policy through the 
establishment of the independent ECB can be regarded as one example in this respect, as 
far as European integration is concerned (Gill 2001). More recently, neo-liberalism has 
been increasingly criticised and challenged and since the demonstrations in Seattle 
against the WTO in 1999 and the World Social Forum process, which started with the 
first forum in Porto Alegre in Brazil in 2001 (Reitan 2007), we can speak about a fourth 
moment of neo-liberalism, the moment of intensified contestation.  
 The exact neo-liberal policies including privatisation, central bank independence, 
liberalisation, flexibilisation of the labour market, public sector restructuring, cutting-
back of trade union rights, etc. and the extent of their implementation differ from country 
to country. Differences are also the result of the fact that there are two strands of neo-
liberalism, the laissez-faire and the social market strand, which have a contrasting 
assessment of how the state can ensure best a fully functioning free market (Gamble 
2006: 21-2). Nevertheless, all neo-liberal restructuring projects are based on two core 
assumptions: ‘first is the belief that inflation is a greater threat to the general welfare than 
unemployment. Second is the belief that phenomena such as unemployment and inflation 
are due to the interventions of the state into an otherwise naturally self equilibrating 
economy’ (Blyth 2002: 147). When discussing debates internal to neo-liberal economics, 
it is important to remember these fundamental commonalities. Otherwise, one runs into 
the danger of incorrectly taking these debates as decisive divisions, while they are 
actually one of the same kind. As Saad-Filho has remarked in relation to the debate 
between Joseph Stieglitz and the IMF over the best economic way forward and to what 
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extent institutions are necessary to correct market failure – a debate closely related to the 
shift from the so-called Washington consensus to the post-Washington consensus – ‘they  
share the same methodological foundations, including reductionism, methodological 
individualism, utilitarianism and the dogmatic presumption that exchange is part of 
human nature rather than being an aspect of society’ (Saad-Filho 2005: 118). Hence, 
these internal debates of neo-liberalism are not the sign of its contestation, but ‘should 
rather be seen as a part of its evolution. Accordingly, these challenges have contributed to 
the simultaneous reproduction and transformation of neoliberal hegemony, rather than to 
its imminent demise’ (Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhöffer 2006: 2). In short, when 
investigating the contestation of neo-liberalism, one needs to be careful, not to mistake 
internal criticism for fundamental challenges. Gramsci’s distinction between ‘historically 
organic ideologies’ and those based on extemporary polemics that are ‘arbitrary, 
rationalistic, or ‘willed’ is significant here. It has to be distinguished between ‘real action 
on the one hand . . . and on the other hand the gladiatorial futility which is self-declared 
action but modifies only the word, not things, the external gesture’ (Gramsci, 1971: 307, 
376-7). 
 Moreover, the fact that neo-liberalism has become dominant is not due to some 
kind of inert qualities. Rather, it was its material structure, the fact that it was pushed by 
the increasingly structurally powerful class fraction of transnational capital, supported by 
important forms of state such as the USA and Britain as well as international 
organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, which pushed it to the fore. Neo-
liberalism, therefore, has to be understood as a project by capital to restore class power 
(Harvey 2006: 29). During the recessions of the 1970s in an atmosphere of a declining 
 8
rate of profit, capital’s prerogative in relation to the means of production had been 
increasingly challenged in the developed world. Relocating production units to other 
parts of the world and deregulating financial markets has not only assisted in generating 
new profit avenues, it also pushed back the working classes in the developed world, 
where trade unions started to lose significant power resources in a situation of 
permanently high levels of unemployment. Hence, as David Harvey argues, ‘neo-
liberalism has been a huge success from the standpoint of the upper classes. It has either 
restored class power to ruling elites (as in the US and to some extent in Britain) or 
created conditions for capitalist class formation (as in China, India, Russia, and 
elsewhere)’ (Harvey 2006: 42).  
 At the forefront of global neo-liberal restructuring has been the increasingly 
powerful transnational capitalist class forming a hegemonic project around neo-liberal 
restructuring (Robinson 2004: 47-9; Sklair 2001: 295). The project itself, as Carroll and 
Carson outline, has been developed within and between a whole range of international 
policy groups of transnational capital, including the International Chamber of Commerce, 
the Bilderberg Conferences, the Trilateral Commission, the World Economic Forum and 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. ‘Taken as a whole, these 
global policy groups can be regarded as agencies of transnational capitalist class 
formation. They provide intellectual leadership that is indispensable in the ongoing effort 
to transform trasnational capital from an economically dominant class to a class whose 
interests take on a sense of universalism’ (Carroll and Carson 2006: 60). Transnational 
capital is supported by its allies of small sub-contracting and supplying firms, specialised 
service companies such as accountants, privileged workers (Gill 1995: 400-1). It is 
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further assisted by the global corporate media, spreading the neo-liberal message, which 
holds this transnational historical bloc together (Robinson and Harris 2000: 31). At the 
European level, transnational capital is not exclusively, but most famously organised 
within the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), an organisation consisting of 
the CEOs of Europe’s most powerful TNCs. It has been behind the emerging compromise 
of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’, which combined a predominantly neo-liberal direction 
with some industrial and social policies in order to broaden the social basis for the neo-
liberal project (van Apeldoorn 2002).  
 Nevertheless, the emergence of an increasingly powerful transnational capitalist 
class at the global and European level, does not imply that there are no differences or 
tensions. Neo-liberalism is variegated in its nature and the individual ways it has been 
implemented within domestic contexts differs. As Huw Macartney outlines in an analysis 
of financial trade associations engaged in EU financial market integration, while there is 
a neo-liberal consensus in these associations’ policy discourse, German, British and 
French transnational finance capital continue to be embedded in distinctive, different 
national-domestic contexts and their related competing accumulation strategies 
(Macartney 2008). In other words, while there is a general convergence around neo-
liberal restructuring in Europe and beyond, there continue to remain national diversities 
and this is also reflected in the different nature of transnational class fractions. ‘Instead of 
a global, homogeneous neoliberal hegemony, we thus need to think of potentially quite 
distinct neoliberal hegemonic constellations, which may be constructed at national, 
transnational, world-regional and global levels’ (Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhöffer 2006: 
3).  
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 Importantly, neo-liberalism as such remains contested. Hegemony constantly has 
to be reconfirmed. Considering the variegated nature of neo-liberalism, the unity of 
transnational capital must not be exaggerated. As Macartney concludes, ‘resistance 
movements would be better advised targeting their efforts towards the EU or international 
institutions where the shared interests of the transnationally oriented fractions remain 
immature, and where social forces could exploit conflicting tendencies’ (Macartney 
2008: 27). Hence, the issue here is to what extent trade unions continue to resist neo-
liberal restructuring in its various expressions within the EU or whether they have 
become co-opted concentrating only on ameliorating the situation within it, without, 
however, challenging neo-liberal restructuring more fundamentally.  
 
Trade unions and neo-liberal restructuring in Europe1 
Trade unions have come under severe pressure as a result of the neo-liberal restructuring 
of the European social relations of production. The deregulation and liberalisation of 
national economies including the labour market has undermined their traditionally strong 
position at the national level. Moreover, neo-liberal economists fundamentally question 
the role of trade unions and often consider them as obstacles to the efficient functioning 
of the free market. Nevertheless, trade unions did support to a large extent the Internal 
Market programme in the late 1980s. Encouraged by the role of the then EU Commission 
President Jaques Delors, who demanded social integration as a necessary counterpart to 
economic integration, they were hoping that economic integration was a first step 
towards the establishment of a political union, which also included a social union 
                                                 
1 The empirical part of this paper is informed by a neo-Gramscian perspective. For an outline and critical 
engagement with this perspective, see Bieler et al (2006) and Morton (2007).  
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(Bieling 2001: 100). Acceptance of EMU and the institutionalisation of neo-liberalism in 
the convergence criteria together with the establishment of the ECB, its focus on price 
stability and the lack of democratic control was more difficult for unions. In the end, 
considering unions’ political weakness during the economic recession in Europe in the 
early 1990s and the small gains of the Social Chapter, trade unions accepted the Treaty of 
Maastricht (Bieling 2001: 105). This support was not uncritical, but followed a ‘yes, but’ 
attitude. European integration was supported as such, but additional social policy 
measures were demanded. As indicated above, it is precisely this attitude, which led to 
the accusations that trade unions have become co-opted into neo-liberal restructuring.   
 It is argued here that such assessments write off trade unions too quickly as 
possible actors in the resistance to neo-liberal restructuring. The ‘yes, but’ attitude should 
not be regarded as acceptance of neo-liberalism as such. European politics is class 
struggle and unions could simply not match the structural power of capital, nor challenge 
the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism at the time. A detailed analysis of the Austrian, 
British, French, German and Swedish labour movements has demonstrated that the vast 
majority of unions, including those which have accepted EMU, continue to resist neo-
liberal restructuring (Bieler 2006). For example, German unions criticised the neo-liberal 
implications of EMU as represented in the convergence criteria and the ECB’s exclusive 
focus on price stability. Unions generally demanded active employment policies at the 
national and European level, a more flexible interpretation of the convergence criteria, 
with some even wanting to add an unemployment criterion to demonstrate a stronger 
emphasis on employment and growth. Some unions also mentioned wage increases in 
line with inflation and productivity increases in order to ensure domestic demand as well 
 12
as tax harmonisation to avoid regime competition within the EU as additional steps. This 
argument was based on the understanding that employment cannot only be achieved via 
structural measures, but also requires demand management. Public investment in 
European-wide infrastructure programmes is one possible way forward in this respect 
(Bieler 2003a: 34-6).  
 In Britain, criticism of the neo-liberal EMU was even more outspoken. On the one 
hand, unions which organise workers in national production sectors, such as the public 
sector union UNISON, strongly opposed EMU, because it would limit national 
expenditure on public services and have a negative impact on growth and employment 
levels. The lack of democratic accountability of the ECB was also highlighted. The 
rejection of EMU membership due to its neo-liberal bias clearly indicates the opposition 
to neo-liberal restructuring by domestic labour in Britain. On the other hand, trade 
unions, which organise workers in export-oriented and transnational manufacturing such 
as Amicus were in favour of EMU membership. Their industrial sector had suffered from 
the high Sterling exchange rate with the Euro. EMU membership would remedy this 
problem. Transnational sector unions too, however, continued to oppose neo-liberalism 
and an endorsement of a single currency did not imply acceptance of EMU’s current 
underlying rationale. These criticisms of EMU were echoed by general unions such as the 
GMB, which organise workers in the public and manufacturing sector and therefore 
understood the relevance of both positions (Bieler 2003a: 31-4). As Strange outlines, 
British pro-EMU unions have always demanded an expansion of the EU’s macro-
economic competence and a focus on high levels of employment as a precondition for 
their support (Strange 1997: 21-3). British unions have adopted a Euro-Keynesian macro-
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economic management project, which is based on an ultimately centralised fiscal and 
monetary policy in a federal union and combined with EU social partnership industrial 
relations (Strange 2002: 356-7).  
 In France, similarly, support for EMU did not automatically imply acceptance of 
neo-liberal restructuring. On the one hand, the confederations CFDT, CFTC, CFE-CGC 
and UNSA supported EMU. Nevertheless, CFTC and UNSA combined this support with 
opposition to the underlying neo-liberal structure of EMU. Only the CFE-CGC, 
organising predominantly cadres and managers in companies, i.e. privileged sections of 
the working class,  endorsed the focus on price stability. The CFDT accepted neo-liberal 
principles to some extent in that it did not reject the convergence criteria and the 
independent status of the ECB, but even this did not reflect a full endorsement of neo-
liberal restructuring. On the other hand, FO and G10-Solidaires strongly criticised EMU 
for its neo-liberal rationale and especially the latter has intensified its co-operation with 
other social movements in the resistance to restructuring. The CGT was critical of the 
neo-liberal rationale of EMU, but more hopeful that this could be changed within EMU 
rather than requiring its abandonment (Bieler 2006: 113-19). 
 The confederation ÖGB set the tone of the general debate in Austria. It accepted 
that EMU and the single currency were beneficial in that they implied greater levels of 
economic stability. Nevertheless, the underlying basis of EMU, its neo-liberal rationale, 
needed to be changed, it was argued. EMU should have full employment as its core focus 
and a related unemployment criterion was demanded in this respect. Moreover, the ECB 
should be asked to concentrate on growth and employment in addition to price stability, 
following here the US Federal Reserve Bank. This should also imply a redefinition of the 
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inflation target. Finally, the ÖGB demanded that in order to ensure domestic demand 
within the EU, wage agreements should follow the formula of productivity increase plus 
inflation (Bieler 2006: 107-8). This position was supported by the majority of unions, 
organising workers in domestic production sectors. Only the metalworkers’ union and the 
chemical workers’ union, organising workers in internationally-oriented sectors, were 
less concerned about the neo-liberal implications of EMU.   
 At the same time, while many European trade unions continued criticising neo-
liberal restructuring, this was not an automatic position as the Swedish case demonstrates. 
The Transport Workers’ Union and the Commercial Workers’ Union, both organising in 
a predominantly domestic production sector, linked their opposition to EMU to a clear 
rejection of neo-liberal restructuring, perceived to be embodied in the convergence 
criteria and the role of the independent, undemocratic ECB. Nevertheless, several of the 
national sector unions, which had not adopted a position on EMU, e.g. the Municipal 
Workers’ Union and the Construction Workers’ Union, were less critical of neo-liberal 
restructuring or, indeed, had adopted some neo-liberal principles. For example, they 
accepted the low inflation policy as well as the role of moderate wage development in 
maintaining economic stability. This acceptance of some neo-liberal principles was even 
more visible in the positions of the transnational sector unions and of the blue-collar 
confederation LO (Bieler 2003b). 
 In sum, these brief examples of European trade unions indicate that many 
continue to question neo-liberal restructuring. At the same time, EMU and other EU level 
neo-liberal policies have also made clear that the national level no longer suffices as the 
focus for opposition to neo-liberalism. The next section will assess the possibilities 
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available at the European level for trade unions to influence policy-making within the 
EU. 
 
Trade union co-operation at the European level 
At European level most national union organisations are members of the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), which claims to represent about 60 million workers in 36 
countries. Furthermore, there are eleven European Industry Federations (EIF) 
representing national unions from certain industries, such as the European Metalworkers 
Federation (EMF) or the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) 
(http://www.etuc.org/r/13). Within the institutional set-up of the EU, trade unions are 
clearly disadvantaged vis-à-vis interest groups of capital, for example, in their capacity to 
influence policy-making. As briefly outlined above, the EU has been characterized by 
neo-liberal restructuring since the mid-1980s. The new, neo-liberal form of state has been 
institutionally protected by removing monetary and economic policy-making from the 
wider influence of actors. Firstly, in a move labelled ‘new constitutionalism’ by Gill 
(2001), monetary policy-making with a focus on low inflation has been handed over to 
the ECB, made up of ‘impartial’ technocrats. Secondly, the core macroeconomic 
decisions are taken by the European Council, the meeting of heads of government and 
heads of state within the EU, which is largely outside lobbying pressure. In June of each 
year, the European Council passes the so-called broad economic policy guidelines, which 
must support the low inflation policy of the ECB, therefore regularly re-confirming neo-
liberal restructuring. 
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 The multilevel nature of governance in the EU provides trade unions as other 
interest groups with easy access to supranational decision-makers, but with a related 
much lower chance of making an impact on the outcome of policy-making (Greenwood 
2003: 29, 73). Trade unions have a particularly close contact to the Directorate General 
(DG) for Employment and Social Affairs, formerly DG V. Overall, however, the 
Commission has 23 DGs, and not all DGs are equally important. The DG for Competition 
and the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs are more decisive within the EU. 
Together with the DG Internal Market and DG Trade they are the hard core of the 
Commission (Interview No.1), driving the neo-liberal project through the discourse of 
competitiveness (van Apeldoorn 2003). Trade unions’ focus on the DG for Employment 
and Social Affairs has often marginalised them within the Commission internal decision-
making process.   
 Multi-sector social dialogue is one of the core avenues for the ETUC to influence 
policy-making in the EU since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991. Should the ETUC and 
their employers’ counterpart UNICE agree on a particular issue, this agreement is then 
passed to the Council of Ministers, which transfers it into a directive without further 
discussion. First successes include the Parental Leave Directive in 1996 (Falkner 1998). 
Overall, however, the significance of the social dialogue should not be exaggerated. To 
date, it has concluded only few agreements establishing minimum standards (Greenwood 
2003: 68), including some agreements such as the one on telework in 2002, which is only 
voluntary and the implementation of which remains the task of the social partners 
themselves. Nevertheless, as the following two examples indicate, despite the structural 
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disadvantage of trade unions, there are positive strategies to influence EU decision-
making.  
 The European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) organizes workers in one of the 
most transnationalized sectors in Europe, including many TNCs in consumer electronics, 
car manufacturing and machinery production. In response to transnationalization, it is 
argued that the EMF had to follow and internationalize its structure and activities. The 
crucial turning-point were the early 1990s. ‘Under the influence of the opening-up of the 
European borders, growing international competition, complete Europeanization of the 
economy and massive unemployment in Europe, [the EMF] had noticed a distinct 
tendency towards a competition-driven collective bargaining policy’ (EMF 2001: 1). 
Plans for EMU further implied the danger of social dumping through the undercutting of 
wage and working conditions between several national collective bargaining rounds 
(EMF 1998: 1-2). The EMF realized that wage bargaining was no longer a national issue 
in its sector, characterized by an increasingly transnationalized production structure. In 
response, the EMF started restructuring itself and began to discuss the potential of co-
ordinating wage bargaining (Interview No.2). The EMF co-ordination strategy has three 
main pillars (EMF 2001: 1): (1) an information exchange system about national collective 
bargaining rounds, the so-called European Collective Bargaining Information Network 
(EUCOB@); (2) the establishment of cross-border collective bargaining networks 
including the exchange of observers for collective bargaining rounds (Gollbach and 
Schulten 2000: 166-76); and (3) the adoption of common minimum standards and 
guidelines, of which wage bargaining co-ordination is not the only but arguably the most 
important aspect. The co-ordination of national wage bargaining was approved in 1998 
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and the EMF tries to ensure that national unions pursue a common strategy of asking for 
wage increases along the formula of productivity increase plus inflation rate (EMF 1998: 
3; Schulten 2005: 274-89). As far as data is concerned, although national negotiators did 
not refer to the EMF guidelines, the actual bargaining results were pretty much within the 
formula until 2001. The current results of bargaining are more out of line with the 
formula, but importantly the guidelines are increasingly used as a political bargaining 
tool (Interview No.2). The main goal of the co-ordination of collective bargaining is to 
avoid the downward competition between different national bargaining rounds and to 
protect workers against the related reduction in wages and working conditions. Thus, ‘a 
coordinated European collective bargaining policy will play a major role in intensifying 
and reinforcing the social dimension of European unity’ (EMF 1998: 1). This, in turn, 
indicates the EMF’s continuing resistance to neo-liberal restructuring.   
 Importantly, the institutional changes have gone hand in hand with an expansion 
of members of staff. In 1989, the EMF had four full time members of staff, now it 
employs 19 (Interview No.2). At the second EMF congress in Prague on 13 and 14 June 
2003, internal decision-making was further facilitated by permitting the Executive 
Committee to adopt recommendations from the policy committees by a two-thirds 
majority. This introduction of majority voting clearly indicates that the EMF has 
developed into an independent actor at the European level. The example of the EMF 
highlights that despite structural disadvantages within the EU form of state, the co-
ordination of bargaining provided a good, alternative way forward, characterized by the 
following three advantages: (1) it does not rely on an employers’ counterpart, which has 
not been willing to engage in meaningful social dialogue; (2) the disadvantaged position 
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within the EU institutional framework is of no consequence, since inter-union co-
ordination does not rely on the compliance of EU or national institutions; and (3) this 
strategy allows to take national differences into account, often cited as the core reason of 
why European-wide union co-operation is impossible. If productivity is lower in one 
country than another, then the wage increase demands in the former country will be lower 
than in the latter accordingly.  
 A second example of European activity is the European Federation of Public 
Service Unions (EPSU) (Bieler 2005: 475-7). It organizes workers in the civil service 
from local to European government as well as in the health sector and general utilities 
such as energy and water. Thus, it organizes workers in all those sectors, which were 
traditionally part of the public sector with a clear national production structure. 
Nonetheless, EPSU has become increasingly active as an independent actor at the 
European level since the 1990s. In order to explain EPSU’s increased activity, one needs 
to refer to the increasing number of decisions taken at the European level. Deregulation 
and liberalization of traditionally domestic production sectors such as energy and public 
procurement has been driven by EU directives and here especially the Services Directive. 
Moreover, the Commission is the EU’s main representative in the negotiation of a 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. The international, European level has, 
therefore, become more relevant for trade union activity as a result. In a letter to EPSU’s 
affiliated unions, the General Secretary Carola Fischbach-Pyttel herself pointed to the 
decisions in relation to public services to be taken at the European level in 2003. This 
included the Commission’s position on GATS negotiations, the report by the working 
group on Social Europe within the Convention on the Future of Europe, the discussion by 
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the EP of draft directives on public procurement and a further opening of the electricity 
and gas markets, a Green Paper by the Commission on Services of General Interest as 
well as a general push by the DG Internal Market towards more deregulation of services 
of general economic interest (EPSU 2003a). According to EPSU, the ‘liberalization 
policies of the European Commission with the majority support of the European Council 
are undermining public services’ (EPSU 2002).  
In resistance to neo-liberal restructuring, EPSU has engaged to some extent in 
sectoral social dialogue in the electricity industry, now the most transnationalized sector 
within the remit of EPSU (Eironline 2002; Eironline 2004b). Moreover, a new social 
dialogue committee in the local and regional government sector was established in 
January 2004, adopting a joint statement on telework as its first measure (Eironline  
2004a). In 2002, the executive committee of EPSU adopted a bargaining information 
exchange system similar to the EMF and appropriately called it EPSUCOB@ and there is 
now an annual collective bargaining conference (Interview No.1). A third strategy 
employed by EPSU has been the lobbying of EU institutions. In relation to GATS, EPSU 
is concerned that EU public services have become bargaining chips for the Commission 
in its attempt to open up other countries for European services exporters (EPSU 2003a). 
Reservations were expressed by EPSU in a meeting with the Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
of DG Trade on 17 February 2003 in relation to the tightness of GATS safety clauses, 
allowing countries to maintain their own regulations, the secrecy of the current 
negotiations, the pressure applied by institutions such as the World Bank on developing 
countries to move towards liberalization in these areas, as well as the rights of foreign 
citizens carrying out contract work within the EU (EPSU 2003b). The most innovative 
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strategy is, however, EPSU’s increasing co-operation with other social movements. In 
relation to GATS, additionally to its direct lobbying of the Commission, EPSU has 
participated in demonstrations organized by Belgian unions and ATTAC on 9 February 
2003 to keep public services out of GATS. Furthermore, it took part in the European day 
of national action on GATS and public services organized by the European Social Forum 
on 13 March as well as the ETUC European day of national action for a Social Europe on 
21 March 2003 (EPSU 2003a). The link with other social movements is also visible in 
relation to public procurement. EPSU and several other EIFs co-operated with a range of 
environmental and other social movements such as Greenpeace Europe and the Social 
Platform, itself a network of European NGOs promoting the Social Dimension of the EU, 
in lobbying the EU Council of Ministers and especially the EP to amend the Draft 
Directive on Public Procurement towards the inclusion of social, ecological and fair trade 
criteria in the award of public procurement contracts (Coalition for Green and Social 
Procurement 2002; Interview No.1). Most recently, EPSU engaged in close co-operation 
with other social movements in relation to the Services Directive, aimed at liberalising 
the provision of public services. It was top of the union’s list of priorities for the period of 
2004 to 2009 and the co-operation with NGOs next to the ETUC and other EIFs was 
identified as part of the overall strategy (EPSU 2005: 2). The campaign culminated in 
two large European demonstrations in Brussels and Strasburg in 2005 and early 2006 
covering trade unions and other social movements from all over Europe (ETUC 2006). In 
the end it was at least successful in preventing the adoption of the initial draft of the 
directive. EPSU is currently following up these efforts with a campaign for a EU legal 
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framework on public services ‘Quality Public Services – Quality of Life’ and the Social 
Platform has publicly declared its support (EPSU 2007).  
 In sum, the increasing involvement by the EU in general and the Commission in 
particular in moves of actual or potential future deregulation and liberalization of national 
public services has intensified EPSU’s engagement at the European level with the aim to 
counter these measures. The case of EPSU demonstrates again that trade unions are 
structurally disadvantaged at the European level, but also that there are strategies 
available, which may help to overcome these disadvantages. In all its activities against 
the further privatization of public services, EPSU has formed close alliances not only 
with other trade unions, but also wider social movements. These alliances present ‘an 
agreement between trade unions, NGOs and employers, that social Europe is the bridge 
that connects Europe to the citizen’ (EPSU 2002). Hence, a separate ‘social discourse’ 
has emerged in the EU and trade unions have successfully used it to broaden their social 
basis of the struggle against neo-liberal restructuring of the public sector, thereby 
increasing their impact on EU policy-making.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper argued that the EU has been restructured along neo-liberal lines since the mid-
1980s, a push mainly supported by European transnational capital. And while inequality 
within Eastern and Western Europe may have been diminished since enlargement, 
inequality within countries and here in particular the new Central and Eastern European 
EU members has drastically increased. Additionally, it was demonstrated that 
transnational capital should not be understood as a homogeneous actor. Neo-liberalism is 
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variegated and hegemonic projects of neo-liberal restructuring always have to be 
reconfirmed. This provides space for resistance. When analysing the role of labour in 
relation to restructuring, it became clear that large parts of the European labour 
movement have not accepted neo-liberalism and continue to resist restructuring. The 
EMF and EPSU were presented as positive examples of how resistance may be 
developed in a successful way at the European level. In the remainder of this paper, I 
want to provide several further reflections on the likelihood of success of resistance.  
 In order to be successful, solidarity between workers across different industrial 
sectors and geographical areas is an absolute precondition. Unfortunately, EU 
enlargement has led to tensions between Eastern and Western trade unions over the issue 
of free movement of labour. It was West European trade unions, which through the 
Economic and Social Committee of the EU, in research by the European Trade Union 
Confederation, as well as through pressure by the German DGB and Austrian ÖGB on 
their respective governments, pushed successfully for a transition period of up to seven 
years in relation to the free movement of labour. They argued that immediate granting of 
this fundamental right could undermine the development of social Europe due to the large 
income gap between East and West. Moreover, it would intensify public fears and thus 
fuel right-wing parties (Bohle and Husz 2005: 102-6). Western labour won, partly also 
because transnational capital sustained only minor economic losses, if any at all, due to 
this concession. Nevertheless, as Bohle and Husz make clear, this political victory based 
on a lack of transnational solidarity may turn out to have disastrous consequences for 
labour in general in that it may result in long-term divisions between the Eastern and 
Western labour movements and thereby weaken European labour overall (Bohle and 
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Husz 2005: 108-9). Within Eastern Europe itself, trade unions, often associated with the 
old communist regimes, have lost influence. Where they have been active recently, this 
was often not in support of solidarity, but in defence of privileged workers. In a 
comparative analysis, Ost describes how unions first supported the restructuring of 
inefficient companies and remained passive in view of the related job losses and then, 
more active again, emerged ‘as small unions of skilled, elite workers, a kind of unionism 
for the new labour aristocracy’ (Ost 2006: 327). In short, it is not clear whether Central 
and Eastern European trade unions are in a position to resist restructuring.  
 On the positive side, the European Social Forum (ESF) process may provide the 
space for Eastern and Western European labour to overcome their tensions and move 
towards more intensive co-operation with other social movements in order to enlarge the 
social basis of resistance. From 6 to 10 November 2002, European ‘anti-globalisation’ 
movements including trade unions, non-governmental organizations and other social 
movements, gathered in Florence, Italy for the first ESF. During 400 meetings around 
32,000 to 40,000 delegates from all over Europe, plus 80 further countries, debated issues 
related to the three main themes of the Forum: ‘Globalization and [neo-] liberalism’, 
‘War and Peace’, as well as ‘Rights-Citizenship-Democracy’. The ESF culminated in one 
of the largest anti-war demonstrations ever on the afternoon of 9 November, when 
500,000 protestors according to police estimates⎯almost 1 million according to the 
organizers⎯marched peacefully through the streets of Florence against the impending 
war on Iraq (Bieler and Morton 2004). Clearly, there were differences between the 
various social movements, established trade unions and new, radical unions. While 
established trade unions continue to focus on ‘social partnership’ with employers and 
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state representatives in order to assert the demands of their members, radical trade unions 
emphasise the importance of bottom-up organisation with a focus on strikes, 
demonstrations and co-operation with other social movements to broaden the social basis 
of resistance. Moreover, tensions also exist between trade unions and social movements. 
While the latter are rather sceptical of trade unions’ hierarchical internal organisation and 
their willingness about confronting neo-liberal restructuring, the former question the 
representativeness and internal accountability of social movements. These differences, 
however, should not make us overlook the commonalities and resulting possible joint 
activities. Despite different structures and strategies, all movements present at the ESF 
identified neo-liberal globalisation, in its economic, deregulatory form as well as 
militaristic version (as embodied in the war on Iraq) as the main target for resistance. 
Hence a convergence of opinions emerged around several areas for joint activities, 
including the call to hold world-wide demonstrations against the impending war on Iraq 
on 15 February 2003 as well as joint activities in defence of the public sector against neo-
liberal restructuring. Similar co-operation efforts were initiated and/or deepened in 
relation to the demand for a European minimum income, the combat of tax evasion, as 
well as the co-ordinated demands for the introduction of a Tobin Tax on currency 
speculations (Bieler and Morton 2004: 312-19). While the second ESF in Paris in 
November 2003 was a disappointment as far as the co-operation between social 
movements and trade unions was concerned, these links experienced renewed emphasis 
at the third ESF in London in October 2004. British trade unions were especially out in 
force for the first time. Moreover, resistance to neo-liberal restructuring in general and 
the privatisation of public services in particular was still the main priority that brought 
 26
together this wide range of different movements. Importantly, there was a much larger 
presence of representatives from Central and Eastern Europe at the ESFs in Paris and 
London in comparison with Florence (Bieler and Morton 2007). It will be interesting to 
see whether this tendency can also be noticed at the next ESF in Malmö from 17 to 21 
September 2008. While the ESF does not necessarily lead to direct decisions on how to 
move resistance forward, it provides the space for different actors to discuss and 
understand each other’s positions and policies. This is precisely where tensions between 
Eastern and Western European trade unions can be discussed and negotiated in order to 
move towards a joint strategy together with other social movements of resisting neo-
liberal restructuring and the related increasing inequalities in Europe.  
 
Interviews 
Interview No.1: Deputy General Secretary, European Federation of Public Service 
Unions (EPSU); Brussels, 22 January 2003.  
Interview No.2: Deputy General Secretary, European Metalworker’s Federation (EMF); 
Brussels, 23 January 2003. 
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